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The Game of Sanctions
Jelica Mini
The FR of Yugoslavia has become, to a great extent by its own merit, a testing range for a large variety of the
international communityÕs punitive tools, including military intervention.  During 1999 only, the EU published in
its official journal 19 postulates, decisions and decrees of castigating nature in connection to the FRY, while during
the first six months of year 2000, it published another 13 similar documents by which punitive measures towards
the FRY were modified, supplemented or newly-introduced.  One of the recent measures that attracted a lot of atten-
tion - the introduction of black and white lists of Serbian companies that are prohibited, or permitted to do business
- represents yet another document in the tiresome "cat and mouse" game, which seems endless.  Who is the winner,
and who the loser of the game?  In neither case can prosperous business interest be on the winning side. 
Companies from the white list, which are "favored" by the mentioned decree, are in fact marginal participants in the
Yugoslav economy that have become victims of their "independence" from the regime and are now subject to a large
variety of pressures and prohibitions.  The EU has very efficiently hindered those who might really deserve to be helped.
Their partners from abroad are also unsatisfied with the decision, as are the partners of other Yugoslav companies that
bear the brunt of the new EU measures.  Moves that have had similar effects are already hard to number.
Let us consider, for instance, international air transport to and from FRY, which had been banned on several
occasions, and permitted over again.  In former Yugoslavia, 80% of international passenger transports in 1989 depart-
ed from Belgrade airport.  Out of 3,500,000 passengers, 1,900,000 traveled to foreign destinations, 1,100,000 of who
a) G17 estimate based on official information from the Federal Statistics Office
FRY Basic Economic Indicators 1999 1999 VI 2000 VI 2000 VI 2000 I-VI 2000
1998 V 2000 VI 1999 I-VI 1999
GDP - USD million 14,224a) -19.3% É É É É
Montenegro É É É É É É
Serbia É É É É É É
GDP per capita - USD 1,699a) -19.1% É É É É
Montenegro É É É É É É
Serbia É É É É É É
Central Serbia É É É É É É
Vojvodina É É É É É É
Industrial Production É -24.1% É -2.0% 48.7% 19.7%
Montenegro É -7.6% É 10.9% -4.1% -1.2%
Serbia É -25.6% É -2.7% 53.9% 21.2%
Central Serbia É -24.5% É -2.0% 55.0% 23.9%
Vojvodina É -28.2% É -3.9% 51.7% 15.1%
Average Wage - DM 107 -31.7% É É É É
Montenegro 154 -14.1% 189 0.5% 23.0% 7.9%
Serbia 102 -33.8% 91 2.1% 4.2% -26.1%
Unemployment Rateb) 27.3% 8.3% É É É É
Montenegro 36.8% 7.9% É É É É
Serbia 26.5% 8.2% É É É É
Export - USD million 1,498 -46.9% 150 3.8% 69.8% 12.8%
Montenegro 123 -4.7% 13.9 6.0% 13.9% 43.1%
Serbia 1,375 -48.9% 136.2 9.0% 78.7% 9.9%
Import - USD million 3,296 -30.3% 272.6 -12.4% 30.9% 33.8%
Montenegro 358 6.9% 19.1 -46.6% -27.9% -14.0%
Serbia 2,938 -33.2% 247.9 -19.2% 131.5% 37.1%
Monetary supply (M1), end of period, DIN billion 16.4 51.9% 22.0 17.4% 71.5% 53.6%
Cash 6.7 34.0% 7.5 30.5% 39.6% 26.5%
Deposits 9.7 67.2% 14.5 11.6% 94.4% 73.2%
Real money supply, end of period, DM million 739 -42.3% 824 20.1% -25.6% -39.7%
Market exchange rate, monthly level 4.25% -38.8% 5.83% 7.4% 165.0% 10.9%
Retail prices É 42.4% É 4.2% 66.2% 57.0%
Montenegro É 60.1% É 2.9% 154.2% 139.0%
Serbia É 41.1% É 4.3% 60.6% 51.7%
Cost of living É 44.9% É 3.9% 74.4% 64.9%
Montenegro É 67.2% É 1.8% 159.3% 149.7%
Serbia É 43.5% É 4.2% 68.4% 58.0%
Industrial prices É 44.2% É É É É
Montenegro É 63.7% É É É É
Serbia É 43.2% É É É É
Black market exchange rate (din/DM) 12.6 88.1% 23.1 1.7% 109.1% 126.4%
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Business interests
have supported
transition in
Southern Europe
flew by foreign flight companies (PANAM, LUFTHANSA, SAS, AIRFRANCE, SWISSAIR, AEROFLOT, etc).
If we look at the social structure of Yugoslav passengers on international flights, we conclude that 80% belong
to the working class of West European countries (economic emigrants), emigrants to America, Canada and Australia,
as well as their relatives that go on visits.  Therefore, "ordinary, small" people are harmed the most, those who can
in no way take the blame for the policy (and undeniable crimes) of the regime. 
The main losers are, therefore, ordinary citizens of Serbia and Montenegro as well as the domestic and foreign
companies that do business on these markets.  Here we will not enter the issue of other political, social, medical,
and psychological traumas related to international isolation. Aristotle warned that an obstruction of communication
is one of the best ways to maintain tyranny.  Today, 2350 years later, we can only confirm that he was right.
Changes - the interest of Serbian economy
Democratic changes in Serbia are not possible if important segments of Serbian economy fail to recognize them
as in their own best interest.  In the mid-seventies, economic circles in Spain, Portugal and Greece blessed the end
of the era of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and turned toward the European integration that upheld the
peaceful transformation of their societies.  With more or less enthusiasm, the same is now happening in Central and
Eastern Europe.  
It could be said that economic circles in Serbia were not the chief conveyers of war and nationalist option in
the early nineties, but they were also not ready to give decisive support to a reform option of the last Federal
Government, which offered peaceful changes.  Business circles did not influence sanctions that the regime intro-
duced against Slovenia, Macedonia, Republika Srpska, or, presently, Montenegro.  Serbian intelligentsia, military and
religious circles, and even many opposition parties supported and articulated the nationalist program of the state-
party oligarchy, which was later to harm the population, economy, and even the natural environment.  War and
international isolation disabled every attempt at economic and social reform.  A specific, perverted transformation
did in fact happen, but through a war economy and the criminalization of society, and not on the basis of a dem-
ocratically established social consensus on the formation of a new system of values and institutions.  
The role of the international community in the crisis and conflicts of former Yugoslavia is also controversial.
The quick recognition of independence for Yugoslav republics, the introduction of EU and UN sanctions, and last-
ly, the NATO military intervention all lead to justifiable questions about the efficiency of the chosen measures and
the judgement of the ones who passed them. 
The European Commission document entitled The Stabilization and Integration Process for Southeast European
Countries (Brussels, May 26th, 1999) discloses a sincere and clear explanation.  During the past ten years, the EU
encountered three large geo-political challenges - the emergence of new independent states in Central and Eastern
Europe, the breakup of the former Soviet Union, and the crisis and conflicts in the "West Balkans".  Each of these
required the development of a new set of policies and instruments.  The offered response is "a perspective of inte-
gration, based on gradual approximation that is adapted to the situation in each respective country".  In other words,
this document defined a regional approach with consideration of different conditions in specific countries, as did
the Pact on Stability for Southeast Europe.  The busy EU agenda marked out a timetable for Southeast Europe after
a delay of ten years.  All the rest can be regarded as buying time until more urgent problems are taken care of (the
immediate eastern border and an always-menacing Russia).
In order to ensure the new regional strategyÕs effectiveness, it is necessary to include Serbia - there is general
consent over this matter.  In order to include Serbia, it is necessary to lift sanctions.  In order to lift sanctions, it is
necessary to achieve political changes.  How can political changes be achieved in a country with a closed economy,
a large degree of state control and intervention, and an authoritarian regime that increasingly resorts to repression?
Is the strategy of "dismantling" the authoritarian system by incorporating particular groups of people, who play
a significant role on the internal scene, into regional and European cooperative and integrative processes sufficiently
fast and effective?  The Szeged process for "free towns and municipalities in Serbia", the Timisoara initiative for "free
media", the Graz process that involves alternative educational structures, the Royaumont process that includes non-
governmental organizations, nonstandard humanitarian assistance (energy for democracy, asphalt for democracy,
schools for democracy), the networking of independent institutes and research centers, as well as continuing and
strenuous work with the opposition in Serbia are surely efforts that deserve attention.
Entrepreneurs for partners
But what is to be done with business circles in Serbia?  Do they entirely identify with the regime?  How can
they be persuaded that their best prospects lie in opening the country and international cooperation?  How can they
be won over and involved in accelerating the process of changes?  Certainly not by applying the policy of general
and "selective" sanctions, as was done so far.  Their effects are obviously limited and very often counterproductive.
Instead, attention should be focused on incorporating, not excluding, business enterprises in Serbia into the swift
process of changes that is taking place in their environment, into challenging regional investments, into adapting to
legal and institutional standards of successful business as they function in Europe and the rest of the world, and into
the indispensable process of learning and competing.
Yet, those who advocate further punishment and isolation will say that a highly compromised state-party oli-
garchy, war profiteers and mafia run the economy in Serbia.  This is an indisputable statement.  However, there still
exists a firm managerial and expert class that has been pushed into a political trap.  
There also exists an authentic private sector that functions in enemy surroundings and endures constant state,
party and mafia racketeering, and the international embargo.  There exists an enormous enterprising spirit derived
from extensive experience in legal international business undertakings and intensive communication with the world,
and from an awareness of the large unexploited resources that lie at hand.  Finally, there exists a genuine interest
in business circles abroad, in Germany and Italy before all, who were traditionally the most successful partners of
the Serbian economy and who regard sanctions as a serious impediment to regaining their dominant roles in the
region, for restituting investments, and for transferring technology.  
Although it is doubtful that the policy of sanctions might change soon, their all-the-more dubious and coun-
terproductive forms are challenging the model of supporting changes in Serbia through punishing the ones who
impede them. Sanctions inhibit changes rather than instigate them.  Still, if the game of sanctions continues, then
it is high time for business circles to become a target group for partner relations, just as with free towns and
municipalities, independent media, non-governmental organizations, opposition parties, etc.  Only then can the
seemingly consolidated monolith of the regime-controlled economy - that persists largely due to sanctions - be
shattered. 
Obstructed 
communication aids
tyranny
Existing strategies
are insufficient
Focus on 
incorporating
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excluding the 
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Agricultural 
production 
and processing
comprise 
48% of GDP
Agriculture in Serbia
Agriculture in Serbia today...
Agriculture occupies an important place in the economy of Serbia, as demonstrated by the following facts:
19% of the total population in Serbia lives from agricultural income, while 60% of that number actively works in
agriculture.  Recent years mark an increase of the number of farmers that perform extensive agriculture due to
the inability to survive by way of their basic activity, a fact that does not appear in official statistical data.  The
share of agriculture, together with industrial branches that produce input for agriculture and process raw materi-
al of agricultural origin, amounts to 48% of Serbia’s GDP.  
Yugoslavia has 4,875,000 hectares of arable land.  Fruit plantations take up 268,000 ha, corn is grown on an
average 1,380,000 ha, wheat on 750,000 ha, sugar beet on 63,000 ha, cattle fodder on an average of 1,200,000 ha,
potato on 100,000 ha, etc.  In the last few years, around 300,000 ha remain uncultivated.  
In the period between 1991 and 2000, characterized by a deep and prolonged economic crisis, the agroin-
dustrial complex proved to be the most vital segment of economy.  The fall of production in agriculture is con-
siderably lower than the fall of investments into agriculture.  This contributed to the maintenance of social peace
in a country where the policy of "bread and circuses" was conducted for years back and at all costs, resulting in
the disastrous state of agriculture.   
Agriculture in Serbia yesterday...
Wheat production per unit of area has been in decline for ten years in Serbia.  Ranging from the average
post-World War II yield of 1.1 t/ha, to the 90’ies yield of 4.2 t/ha, the one obtained in 1999 was 3.3 t/ha, while
this year an average of 2.3 - 2.8 t/ha is projected.  A comparison can be made with the 7.7 t/ha yield in England
in 1984.  The main reason for this state is the declining investment into agriculture and a considerable deviation
from optimum production technologies, while the underlying total economic disaster also affects agricultural pro-
duction.  
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80% of arable land
is in private 
ownership
The fact that more than 250,000 ha of land remained uncultivated last year in Serbia is astonishing, as well
as that the average corn crop in Serbia in the past ten years was 3.8 t/ha, while it was around 7.7 t/ha in European
Union countries.  Instead of conducting systemic reforms in agriculture and seeking out real sources of finance,
the regime is passing repressive laws such as the Law on Supplements to the Law on Agricultural Land, which
penalizes farmers for leaving land uncultivated, without any consideration of the limit of an average agricultural
household’s financial endurance.  If we analyze the mentality of country folk, we realize that their greatest shame
is to leave the land uncultivated and unsowed - then we can imagine what misery has befallen our countryside.  
Most frequently stated reasons for the drop of yield are unfavorable weather conditions, such as an insuffi-
cient amount of rainfall during summer months.  But, in years with favorable weather conditions lower average
yields were also observed, which implies that other limiting factors are at work.  They are, above all: the use of
inadequate planting material; shortage of fuel, mineral fertilizers and pesticides; outdated machinery; the low tech-
nological level of production; and, principally, the low profitability of production.  
Most producers are turning to less accumulative cultures such as wheat, corn, etc., which is not only a con-
sequence of the lack of production investment capital, but also of the low degree of knowledge about new cul-
tivation and processing technologies.  The existing Institutes and Agricultural Bureaus have highly trained per-
sonnel, but their activities are mainly directed to the state sector, while private agricultural producers are deprived
of new technologies.  
The picture is no brighter in the field of crop protection.  Experts are still managing crop protection on social
estates, but the bad situation in the economy is disabling its adequate application.  Private estates — which com-
prise about 80% of arable land - offer a different image.  Producers that are well off employ phytopathologists
privately, while most are left to their own experience or take the advice of employees in agricultural drugstores
that are not qualified according to the Law on Crop Protection standards.  Only about 5% of agricultural drug-
stores employ agricultural engineers.  
Parameters Central Serbia Vojvodina
Socal Private Total Socal Private Total
Sector Sector Sector Sector
Cultivated land (ha) 737,000 4,115,000 4,852,000 563,981 1,085,317 1,649,298
Cultivated land by % 15.2 84.8 100 34.2 65.8 100
Number of tractors in every category 13,300 406,674 419,974 10,000 100,383 110.383
Current cultivated land per tractor (ha) 56.4 10.1 56.4 10.8
Optimal cultivated land per tractor (ha) 50 20 50 25
Current average usage of a tractor per year (hours) 900 300 912 430
Optimal average usage of a tractor per year (hours) 1,200 700 1,300 800
Current average age of tractors (years) 15 19 15 19
Optimal average age of tractors (years) 18 12 18 12
Number of grain combines 3,380 15,787 19,167 2,582 4,427 7,009
Current number of combines per 100 ha 0.45 0.38 0.45 0.40
Optimal number of combines per 100 ha 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7
Number of single axel tractors 206 241,196 241,402 60 22,005 22,065
Corn pickers 268 32,412 32,680 203 21,380 21,583
Various attachable harvesting machines 29,221 1,339,224 1,368,445 22,194 398,280 420,474
Motorized sprinklers 2,069 45,418 47,487 1,502 11,338 12,840
Apparatus for milking 1,681 16,997 18,678 959 6,111 7,070
Self-propelled motorized reapers 136 36,681 36,817 89 2,835 2,924
Silos for grain approx. 140 in total (estimated total capacity: 600,000 tons)
State and Structure of Agricultural Technology
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Any serious government that genuine-
ly wishes prosperity for Serbia would
first have to acknowledge that it is an
agricultural country, and aim develop-
ment strategies accordingly. Develop-
ment programs cannot be made after
rule is acquired, they should be ready
for immediate realization. The G17 PLUS
Group for Agricultural and Countryside
Improvement has assembled many
experts from this field and started devel-
oping such a program.  
The starting point of the program is a
complete reorganization of the Ministry
of Agriculture. Agricultural development
depends principally upon the applica-
tion of new technologies, while their
introduction and control can be carried
out only by a ministry that is organized
and qualified according to contemporary
standards.  Parallel to a reorganization of
the Ministry, agricultural estates and col-
lective farms should be privatized so as
to enable their functioning in the short-
est possible time.  Institutes should be
put under supervision of the Ministry of
Agriculture and actively participate in all
development programs.
The Agricultural and Countryside Improvement Program
250,000 ha of 
land remained 
uncultivated 
last year
Private producers
are deprived of new
technologies
The precondition
for development is
low-interest 
agricultural credits 
While not conforming to contemporary standards, the existing legal regulations represent a solid base for the
efficient production and sale of planting material and of safe and effective means for crop protection.  However,
the problems arise over the regulationsÕ implementation in practice.
Agriculture in Serbia tomorrow...
Because 80% of arable land is in private ownership, it is realistic to strive for quickly achieving a level of agri-
cultural production close to that of developed European countries, providing that a serious approach to agrarian
problems is taken and other macroeconomic problems are resolved.  The large extent of rich arable land, high lev-
els of know-how that could quickly be transferred to producers, the proximity of the European market, and the
prospects of a fast reconstruction and expansion of infrastructure through an appropriate policy of credits and invest-
ment all bode well for the future of agriculture in Serbia.  
The program for the political, regulatory and economic changes to enable strong and globally competitive agri-
cultural production is extremely complex.  It implies a global strategy as an essential element of state policy, one
that gives emphasis to decentralization and free market economy and that systematically decreases state interven-
tionism. Social policy must be separated from agricultural production, so that agricultural development is lead by
the business logic of individual farmers rather than political agendas directed from the center.
The program has two phases.  The first phase would be a curative process, where raising the technological
sophistication of production and processing would be emphasized, along with reconstruction of the old and con-
struction of new infrastructure. Agroeconomic research shows that agricultural production development depends
primarily upon the application of new technologies.  Production would quickly rise as it shifted away from a semi-
intensive level with a low degree of capacity utilization.  
The program’s second phase, after political and economic conditions have stabilized somewhat, entails com-
plex measures of economic policy that would aid the development of strong "family farming" companies as the
future basic structure of rural development. 
In order to solve the accumulated problems in agriculture, the first link of the chain is the village household.
Life in a rural community might become more attractive and interesting only if it is understood that not all mem-
bers of the household must necessarily take part in agricultural labor.  To meet this need, developed societies have
special funds for low cost micro-credits and loan guarantees to aid the creation and expansion of small and medi-
um-sized companies in rural areas.  
A shift to the "farming type" of production should take place, which implies a maximum intensification of pro-
duction and the application of new cultivation technologies, along with the formation of regional producers’ asso-
ciations in order to facilitate market entry.  To compete globally on both price and quality, a network for training
agricultural producers in the most modern techniques must be formed, as well as a product quality control network.
Expert services should be made easily and constantly available to producers on the local level, under the patron-
age of the Ministry of Agriculture. A modern information system must be established and available to all producers
and organizations via the Internet.
Every agricultural producer must function like a small private company and always be market-oriented, but the
main precondition for development is the formation of funds for low-interest credits to support large investments
into highly accumulative agricultural projects.  State intervention must be limited to the protection of producers and
the market from monopolies and dumping, and to defining clear strategic goals for the stateÕs material reserves
whose purchase prices will be guaranteed.   
A resolution to institutional problems, changes in economic regulations, the minimization of administrative pro-
cedures, and, first and foremost, the formation of a real capital market are the key prerequisites for developing agri-
culture in Serbia.  Everything else is pure demagogy. 
Social policy must
be separated from
agricultural 
production
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This year’s wheat harvest in Serbia
(without Kosovo) is modest at best.
Only 625,000 ha were sown last autumn.
Floods and underground waters have
destroyed the yield from 45,000 ha, or
7.2%, so that the harvested area is
580,000 ha.  However, weather was not
to blame for the yield or quality of grain,
because some localities achieved yields
of over 6 t/ha.  
1,875,000 t of grain have been stored
in silos and granaries.  The average yield
amounted to 3.0 t/ha on harvested and
3.32 t/ha on sown areas.  The physical
and technological quality barely reaches
an acceptable limit.  This year’s grain
harvest is down almost 1,000,000 t from
the optimum yield, and down 50,000 t
relative to last year.  The average yield
per ha was down by 0.03 t/ha, and of
lesser grain quality. This year’s wheat
harvest can just barely ensure nourish-
ment security of the population and sup-
ply annual strategic state needs in the
amount of 1,500,000 t of grain, while the
possibility of exports is insignificant.  It
should be kept in mind that seeding
feed wheat and grains account for part
of this yield.  
The poor results of wheat production
are a direct consequence of bad agrari-
an policy contributing to very low
investments into production (generating,
over time, a low agrotechnical level).  In
the so-called optimum term, only 55% of
arable land was sown. The purchase
price of 4 din/kg that the state offered is
destimulating.  Calculations show that
an average 3.5 t/ha yield is needed in
order to have no loss at the offered
price.  Unfortunately, less than 30% of
produced grain will be offered for pur-
chase.  This suggests that supplies of
flour and bread will be unstable and that
prices are sure to rise.  
Dr Radomir Popovi
Wheat Harvest 2000
MACROECONOMIC REVIEW
Prices
June retail price growth amounted to 4.3% in Serbia, and 2.9% in Montenegro.  The two add up to a
monthly price growth of 4.2% for the whole country.  The FRY inflation rate has more of an accounting than
real effect, since there are many obstacles in trade between Serbia and Montenegro, and the FRY market can-
not be described as a single one, with uniform prices for the same merchandise. 
Month-on-month June’s inflation rate down
by 1%.  However, since official data statistics are
unreliable, it cannot be concluded that inflation
is curbed.  All the more since estimates say that
June retail price growth in Serbia surpassed 6%.
We are, therefore, still within the scope of a 5-6%
monthly inflation rate, amounting to 80-100%
inflation annually.  This indicates that the domes-
tic market remains far from stable, and that sub-
duing prices to control inflation is not giving any
results.  More than 60% of prices are on a variety
of control regimes, resulting primarily in prob-
lems for companies whose prices are controlled
rather than in preventing price growth. 
The cost of living in June followed retail
price growth, so that in Serbia it rose by 4.2%,
and by 1.8% in Montenegro, or 3.9% in FRY.  A
larger difference between retail price growth
and the cost of living can be expected, since
June traditionally brings a seasonal drop in the
prices of agricultural products.  Because they
have a much larger share in the consumer bas-
ket, they affect an accounting of the cost of liv-
ing more than they do retail prices.  Growth in
the cost of living in Montenegro lagged relative
to retail price growth.  In Serbia, however, the
difference has narrowed to 0.1%, which indi-
cates the artificial curbing of inflation has failed.  
According to official statistical data, prices of agricultural products fell by 7.8%, while prices of industrial
products and services rose by 3.8%, or 5.9% relative to May.  
Production
Industrial output in June demonstrates a normal seasonal drop.  Month-on-month production fell by
2% in June. As usual, production trends differ in Serbia and Montenegro: Serbia saw a drop of 2.7%, while
Montenegro posted a 10.9% rise in industrial production. Equipment and raw material output marked a
drop of activity, while, consumer products were on the rise. Metallurgy and nonmetal production, includ-
ing construction material, recorded the largest individual drop at over 9%, while textile production
showed a growth rate of almost 9%.  
The first half of last year included the conflict with NATO.  During that period, the output of con-
sumer goods was better off than equipment and raw material production.  After the conflict ceased, things
returned to normal.  The period of post-war reconstruction marks a slower rate of consumer goods pro-
duction than that of equipment and raw materials.  
As such, the first six months of this year record consumer goods output growth of 13%, equipment
output growth of 38% and raw material output
growth of 25%, year-on-year.  
Total output in FRY during the first six
months, year-on-year, was up by 21%.  Such
growth cannot be maintained until the end of the
year, because the base for comparison is much
larger in the second half than in the first half of the
year. The Review projects that this year’s industri-
al production will exceed last year’s by 14%.  This,
of course, is not enough to return the country’s
production level to that achieved the year that
preceded the conflict with NATO. 
While the Yugoslav economy remains in a
period of post-war reconstruction, it is not in a
stage of economic development.  The recession
that the country entered before the bombing is
still at large.  Compared to previous years, pro-
duction is at the level acquired in 1995-96.  The
government believes that the basic problem lies
in the lack of real aggregate demand, resulting in
the inability of maximizing production capacities.
However, even if that problem were mitigated -
as it was with revenue from the sale of Telekom
in 1997, or by a lifting of sanctions - there would
not be much space for faster consumer goods
and raw material output growth.  Outdated tech-
nology and low quality merchandise remain seri-
ous obstacles to economic growth.
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Foreign trade and the exchange rate
Total foreign commercial trade in June did not differ significantly from what was achieved in the pre-
vious two months.  If we add necessary corrections to import and export data - usually initial export data
are lesser than the final by 15 to 20 million dollars, while those for imports are lesser by 50 to 60 million
dollars - then the foreign trade level in June amounts to 490 million dollars.  Exports account for 165 mil-
lion dollars, and imports for 325 million dollars.  The commodity trade level is somewhat higher than it
was in May, and equal to the one in April.  Therefore, foreign trade has demonstrated stability in the past
three months.
Fluctuations of the real exchange rate of the dinar on the parallel foreign currency market and the
level of the trade deficit recorded nonstandard behavior.  From the beginning of the year to June, the
dinar had rarely appreciated in relation to the German mark.  Such movement of the real exchange rate
of the dinar has formerly contributed to an increase of the foreign trade deficit.  That was the case in the
January 1995 - November 1997 period.  This year does not show the same pattern.  On the contrary, we
only perceive oscillations of the deficit around an average monthly level of 185 million dollars.      
Similar irregular movement happened in the second half of last year.  The dinar constantly depreci-
ated, while an end of the conflict with NATO
directly influenced the deficit.  Such a relation
did not exist in the period between December
1997 and mid-1999, when there was real
depreciation of the dinar, while the foreign
trade deficit fell.  Seasonal oscillations of the
foreign deficit happened then as well, while
changes of the real dinar exchange rate were
less influenced in the same way.
Namely, since June this year another offi-
cial dinar exchange rate was introduced.  It is
the so-called stimulative rate of 16 dinars to
the German mark.  The official and stimulative
rates form a new legal rate of 20 dinars to the
mark.  Two things are important here: firstly,
devaluation has not been officially proclaimed
so that the financial effects of devaluation are
not registered in banking balances; secondly,
the new exchange rate to the German mark is
still below its parallel market exchange rate.
In June the spread between official and paral-
lel rates was down to three dinars, while the
spread rose to four dinars at the end of July.
Monetary policy
The Yugoslav economy is under mone-
tized, i.e. there is not enough real domestic
money on the Yugoslav market.  This is a
result of mistrust in the domestic currency,
and high currency substitution through which
the German mark has suppressed the dinarÕs circulation.  From the end of 1997 to June this year, the trend
of declining real money mass is easily recognizable.  
At the end of May there were 18.7 billion dinars in circulation.  Estimates project an increase of at
least 1% in money mass, and an additional 4-5% increase in July.  In the first seven months of this year
M1 money mass increased by over 3 billion dinars, which is an increase of around 19%.  Prices, although
controlled, rose in the same period by 35%, so that the real money mass decreased.  
Furthermore, there is a great problem of insolvency in the economy.  Transaction demand for money
is well expressed by the real mass of public revenue.  This should not be surprising since public revenues
account for over 55% of GDP.  The series of
real fiscal revenues shows considerable stabil-
ity of this variable, in spite of all cyclic fluctu-
ations.  Following a certain drop in the
months of the conflict with NATO, fiscal rev-
enues are maintaining their real value.  As
compared to the previous period, these rev-
enues were bigger during the course of 1997
only, as a consequence of a large foreign cur-
rency inflow after the privatization of
Telekom.
Transaction demand for money is quite
stable, while the real supply of money is
recording a downward trend.  The National
Bank of Yugoslavia, however, cannot increase
the money issue because that would lower the
dinar exchange rate to the German mark and
immediately increase the already high infla-
tion.  Monetary policy is struggling between
trying to maintain stability and incite econom-
ic activity.  This position cannot be main-
tained by the NBY for long.  With the election
period ahead of us - when greater money
issue usually covers many accumulated debts
- a more expansive monetary policy can be
expected.
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